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REFORMING EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
SARAH ANNE MOURER*

INTRODUCTION

B

obby Joe Leaster never committed a crime in his life. As a
child, his worst misbehavior was sneaking off to go fishing
when he was supposed to be in church.1 On September 27, 1970,
Bobby Joe was arrested and charged with a murder that he did not
commit. Late that afternoon, a man named Levi Whiteside was shot
and killed during a holdup at a neighborhood store. Bobby Joe was
standing on a nearby street corner on his way to visit his nephew.
Bobby Joe was wearing clothes that matched eyewitness descriptions
of the man who killed Levi Whiteside. The police detained him and
took him to Boston City Hospital where Kathleen Whiteside had just
identified her husband’s body. She had been administered sedatives
twice already, but she was still hysterical. She had been present at her
husband’s murder, held at gunpoint by the assailant, and looked the
perpetrator in the face for at least three minutes.2 The police
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1. Charles Kenney, Justice for Bobby Joe, THE BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Feb. 28,
1988, available at http://www.nodp.org/ma/stacks/b_leaster.html.
2. Commonwealth v. Leaster, 479 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Mass. 1985).
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presented only Bobby Joe to her, in handcuffs, asking, “Is this him?”
She identified him. He spent fifteen years in prison as a result.3
The prosecutor did have corroborating evidence against Bobby
Joe. At a grand jury hearing, a witness from the store also identified
4
Bobby Joe. Bobby Joe also told police that he was with his girlfriend
at the time of the murder. When the police attempted to confirm his
5
Subsequently,
alibi with Bobby Joe’s girlfriend, she denied it.
exculpatory evidence came to light. A Boston schoolteacher saw a
photograph of Bobby Joe in a magazine article and knew that he had
been wrongfully convicted. The schoolteacher had been near the
scene moments after the murder and had seen two men fleeing,
neither of whom were Bobby Joe. Bobby Joe was exonerated after
spending 16 years in prison, from 1970 to 1986.6
Courts today continue to allow into evidence suggestive
identification testimony similar to that in Bobby Joe’s case. Currently,
courts consider the admissibility of identification testimony under a
7
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process analysis. If a court
determines that a pretrial identification was unnecessarily suggestive,
it then ascertains whether the suggestive procedure gave rise to a
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.8 A court will
find a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification only if
9
the identification is found to be unreliable. Therefore, even if the
court concludes that a police identification procedure was suggestive,
it may be admissible if the court finds that the identification is
nevertheless likely to be accurate.10 A court will balance the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure against the likelihood
that the identification is correct, resulting in an unprincipled rule of
law that turns on the court’s subjective assessment of the defendant’s
guilt.11 As Bobby Joe’s case demonstrates, courts will admit
misidentifications, and juries will convict in reliance upon them.12
3. See Kenney, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972).
8. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977).
9. Id. at 114.
10. Id.
11. The Court’s current due process approach has created significant confusion, and as a
result, there is no uniformity between courts on the issue of whether corroborating evidence of
guilt should be used to assess the validity of an identification. Seven circuit courts disagree
about whether this factor should be included. The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
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Given these serious drawbacks with the due process approach, this
Article reexamines police eyewitness identification procedures13 in
the first instance under the Fourth Amendment. It explains why a
suggestive lineup may properly be a Fourth Amendment concern. It
also explores why such an analysis may be more effective in excluding
identification testimony at trial because of the objectives of the
14
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.
Under this rule, all
identification testimony resulting from suggestive lineups would be
suppressed, whether or not the identification is thought to be
accurate. Furthermore, a Fourth Amendment approach to lineups
better lends itself to the imposition of clear and consistent guidelines
than does the current due process analysis.
Analyzing lineups under the Fourth Amendment may accomplish
two goals. First, if courts find it persuasive, it can correct the ways in
which the courts have failed and provide the most effective means to
protect the innocent from wrongful convictions resulting from
misidentifications. Second, even if courts do not find it immediately
persuasive, using a Fourth Amendment lens can still provide a useful
basis for understanding the shortcomings of the current due process
test under the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article raises many
issues that will require significant dialogue before effective solutions
may be reached. The regulations and criteria recommended in this
Article are suggestions designed in hopes of sparking debate and
furthering scholarly discussion.

consider other evidence of guilt, while the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits only look to the
reliability of the identification itself. See Suzannah B. Gambell, The Need to Revisit the Neil v.
Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189, 210
(2006).
12. See Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Braithwaite Revisited: Towards a
New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41
VAL. U.L. REV. 109, 110 (2006) (noting that eighty-eight percent of rape case exonerations and
fifty percent of murder case exonerations have been due to misidentifications).
13. “Police eyewitness identification procedures” include lineups and show-ups and may be
referred to hereinafter simply as “lineups.” A “show-up” is an identification procedure where
only one individual or photo is presented to the witness for possible identification.
14. The exclusionary rule, as it applies to the Fourth Amendment, has a remedial function.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914). The benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule to eyewitness testimony outweigh the social cost. Application of the exclusionary rule in
Fourth Amendment violations typically excludes valid evidence. However, application of the
exclusionary rule for suggestive eyewitness identification procedures will often exclude invalid
evidence, specifically misidentifications.
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Section I discusses the problem of misidentifications.
Misidentifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions,15 and
many result from unregulated lineups and identification procedures.16
Section II presents an overview of human memory function and
discusses how suggestion influences memory.
Section III
demonstrates why lineups are a significantly unreliable police
investigatory procedure and how suggestion pervades lineups. The
accuracy of an eyewitness identification procedure rests largely on
memory, a human function uniquely prone to molding, suggestive
17
influence, and error. Section IV reviews the current due process law
regarding suggestive identification procedures. Currently, courts
permit eyewitness identification testimony resulting from even highly
suggestive identification procedures if the court determines that the
identification was “reliable.”18 Courts use a set of factors to decide if
an identification is “reliable,” but these do not reliably indicate by
19
themselves that the identification is accurate.
Section V explains how a claim regarding an unregulated or
20
suggestive lineup is supportable under the Fourth Amendment. This
Article proposes that an unregulated lineup is an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Although one might initially
assume this notion lacks support, a closer look at the case law and
intent of the Fourth Amendment will reveal that the unreasonable
risk to the individual in a suggestive or unregulated lineup is a Fourth
Amendment concern. Indeed, courts have suggested that the
reliability of a police investigatory procedure is relevant in terms of
the Fourth Amendment.21 This Article proposes that, in addition to
the physical intrusion of the seizure, the lack of reliability in

15. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005).
16. Id.
17. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory Faults and Fixes, ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH., Summer
2002, at 43.
18. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197 (1972).
19. See David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to Return
to the Wade Trilogy Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 606 (Spring 1987).
20. The skeptical reader should withhold judgment and render a verdict after reading the
entire Article.
21. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969). In Davis, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the defendant could be fingerprinted with less than probable
cause, in part because fingerprinting is a reliable scientific police investigatory procedure. Davis
went as far as to comment that probable cause was not required because fingerprinting is not as
prone to error as police investigatory procedures such as lineups.
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eyewitness identification procedures also triggers Fourth Amendment
protections.
Section VI recommends two types of procedural safeguards that
should be required before courts admit identification testimony. First,
there must be reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed
the crime for which identification is sought. Section VI places this
proposal in the context of the varying standards for different kinds of
intrusions under current Fourth Amendment law. Second, nine
guidelines should be used to evaluate lineups. This section briefly lays
out these guidelines and explains why their use will significantly
reduce the likelihood of misidentifications. Section VII then discusses
exceptions to the use of these procedural safeguards.
This Article proposes that analyzing eyewitness identification
procedures through a Fourth Amendment perspective will help clarify
the problems with courts’ current approaches. Such an assessment is
a useful starting point to evaluate and highlight the issues surrounding
the current standards. Viewing the suggestion involved with
eyewitness identification procedures as a Fourth Amendment issue
may seem unconventional initially. This Article does not intend to
provide all of the answers and single-handedly create new standards
for lineups under the Fourth Amendment. Rather, this Article’s
primary goals are to begin a discourse on the impact of the Fourth
Amendment on identification procedures and to provide guidance in
the area of reform for eyewitness identification procedures generally.
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Available numbers regarding exonerations reflect only a small
fraction of wrongful convictions and innocent individuals jailed and
prosecuted. Many experts estimate that wrongful convictions may
amount to as many as five percent of all convictions each year.22 With
the aid of DNA testing, exonerations now number 207 nationwide.23
Yet, DNA testing may reveal only a very small percentage of the
actual wrongful convictions, as only ten percent of felony cases

22. See Gambell, supra note 11, at 190 (citing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4-1 (3d ed. 1997)).
23. Innocence Project: Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,
Eyewitness Misidentification in Florida and Nationwide, http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/
FloridaMistakenID.pdf. Exonerations are not limited to DNA testing. See Gross et al., supra
note 15, at 524 (reporting that since 1989, 340 people have been exonerated after conviction of
serious crimes).
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involve biological evidence that could be utilized for testing.24 In
addition, not all of the ten percent are actually tested. Many accused
who plead guilty or “no contest” to the crime are not eligible for
25
DNA testing even if biological evidence exists. National estimates
indicate that there are at least 10,000 wrongful convictions each year.26
Many more innocent people are arrested and prosecuted, though
ultimately not convicted.
Misidentification accounts for more wrongful convictions than all
27
other causes combined. Recent studies and research confirm that an
individual placed in an unregulated identification procedure incurs a
substantial risk of being misidentified, jailed, and even wrongfully
convicted.28 In the first eighty-two DNA exonerations, mistaken
eyewitness identification was a factor more than seventy percent of
the time, making it the leading cause of wrongful convictions in DNA
cases.29
An example of a dangerously unreliable eyewitness
identification procedure occurred in the highly publicized Duke
lacrosse team case, in which the identification procedure involved
only suspects. 30 This extreme example serves to remind us of the
degree of error and significant suggestion in police lineups. Up to
eighty percent of the time, juries believe witnesses making eyewitness
identifications, regardless of whether the witnesses are correct.31
32
Eyewitness identification testimony compels juries to convict.
II. MEMORY AND SUGGESTION
A specific look at how memory functions and how suggestion
operates illustrates why participation in unregulated lineups creates
unreasonable risks of misidentification. Identification procedures
24. Comments of the Florida Innocence Initiative, Inc. at 5, In re Amendment to the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.853, No. SC05-1702 (Fla. amended/adopted Sept.
21, 2006).
25. The Justice Project, FL: Post-Conviction DNA Testing Update and Death Row
Exoneration, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMER: Vol. 3. No. 3. (Washington D.C.), Mar. 23,
2006, at 4, at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/about/newsletter/the-criminal-justice-1.html#FL.
26. See Gambell, supra note 11, at 190.
27. Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615, 623
(2006).
28. Id.
29. Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 70 n.32 (2003).
30. See Aaron Beard, Duke Prosecutor is Under Heavier Fire, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec.
28, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=2756978.
31. Gary L. Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in
Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 278 (1980).
32. Id.
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differ from other police investigatory procedures in that they solely
rely on human memory.33 Human memory consists of three basic
systems: (1) encoding, (2) storage, and (3) retrieval.34 “Encoding” is
the initial processing of an event that results in a memory. “Storage”
is the retention of the encoded information. “Retrieval” is the
recovery of the stored information.35 Errors can occur at each step.
Contrary to common understanding of memory, not everything that
registers in the central nervous system is permanently stored in the
mind and particular details become increasingly inaccessible over
36
time.
37
In fact, details are often permanently lost. To be mistaken about
details in the recollection of an event is completely normal and not a
function of a poor memory. We can even come to believe that we
remember events that never actually occurred.38 When people
construct a memory, they gather fragments of what they have stored
39
and fill in the gaps with what makes most sense to them. Human
beings recall events by adding these bits and pieces to their
recollections based on their subjective understandings of the world.
As Professors Loftus and Ketchum note, “Truth and reality, when
seen through the filters of our memories, are not objective facts but
subjective, interpretive realities.”40 Because these processes are
unconscious, individuals generally perceive their memories as
completely accurate and their reporting of what they remember as
entirely truthful, no matter how distorted or inaccurate they, in fact,
41
may be. An individual’s memories become distorted even in the
absence of external suggestion or internal personal distress. Naturally,
people tailor their telling of events to the listener and the context.
Each act of telling or retelling changes the teller’s memory of the

33. Confessions and interrogations are highly unreliable as well, because the results are
dependent on the functioning of the human mind.
34. RICHARD GERRIG & PHILIP ZIMBARDO, PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 209–10 (17th ed.
2005).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE
ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL 20 (1991).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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event.42 Loftus and Ketchum explain, “This is why a fish story, which
grows with each telling, can eventually lead the teller to believe it.”43
Many conditions such as fear, lighting, distance from the event,
44
For
surprise, and personal biases all affect memory and recall.
example, racial stereotypes may affect memory and recall.
Preconceptions, conscious or unconscious, shape our memories. In
one study, participants were shown four news stories, each containing
an identical photograph of the same African-American man. The
stories described: (1) a college professor, (2) a basketball player, (3) a
non-violent crime, and (4) a violent crime. After viewing the photos
and reading the stories, the participants were asked to reconstruct the
photo of the man for each story by selecting from choices of facial
features. The stories involving criminal conditions resulted in the
selection of more pronounced characteristically African-American
facial features. This was particularly true for the violent crime
scenario.45
Participants’ preconceived notions and stereotypes
affected their choices.
Human memory is indeed delicate, especially regarding victims
and witnesses of crimes. Fear and traumatic events may impair the
46
At the time of an
initial acquisition of the memory itself.
identification, the witness is often in a distressed emotional state.
Many victims and witnesses experience substantial shock because of
their traumatic experiences that continue to affect them at the time of
identification procedures. In eyewitness identification procedures,
witness motivation to make an identification may also be very
powerful. Such witnesses may seek rapid resolution and closure,
possibly leading to hasty identifications of fillers47 in the absence of

42. Laura Engelhardt, The Problem with Eyewitness Testimony: Commentary on a Talk by
George Fisher and Barbara Tversky, 1 STAN. J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 27 (1999).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Penn State, Readers’ Memories Of Crime Stories Influenced By Racial Stereotypes,
SCIENCE DAILY, May 6, 2004, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/05/040506073047.htm
(last visited February 28, 2008).
46. Id. However, courts persist in erroneously believing that witnesses experiencing
elevated emotional states produce more accurate recollections or perceptions. For example, in
Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 473 (6th Cir. 2005), the court found that the identification
was admissible in part because the witness was in a heightened state of stress at the time of the
event and presumably would better remember the perpetrator as a result.
47. A “filler” is a known innocent person placed in a lineup.
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the true perpetrator. Furthermore, their recall is often distorted and
untrustworthy because of their traumatic experiences.48
The presence of a weapon may also influence a witness’s ability to
recall the face of the perpetrator. Studies show that when a weapon is
49
present during an event, perpetrator recognition ability is impaired.
The witness may be focusing on the weapon, instead of the culprit,
during the criminal episode. In one study where the weapon was
placed in a prominent location, recall was worse than when the
weapon was partially hidden or off to the side.50 Other studies
indicate that the location of the weapon does not affect memory
51
accuracy. Another explanation may be that the witness is more
alarmed and experiences a higher arousal level in the presence of a
weapon, which in turn impairs memory acquisition. Some studies
show an absence of the “weapon effect” in non-arousing classroom or
laboratory settings.52 A variety of other external factors influence and
may impair a witness’s ability to recall an event or the face of a
perpetrator. For example, witnesses have difficulty identifying
perpetrators cross-racially, which may relate to individual internal
biases. Studies show accurate suspect identification rates are much
greater under same-race conditions.53 In addition, older adults have
increased difficulty with cognitive performance and perform worse in
identification procedures. Ironically, older adults who recall more
details about a culprit are actually more likely to make false
identifications.54
Memory and recall are highly susceptible to suggestion. For
example, studies show that misinformation following an event may
lead to incorrect recall of the event.55 If a victim is told that the
perpetrator was holding a gun after observing the perpetrator holding
a knife, the victim may subsequently report that she recalls seeing the
perpetrator holding a gun. Researchers have called this phenomenon
48. See Tom Singer, To Tell the Truth, Memory Isn’t that Good, 63 MONT. L. REV. 337, 360
(2002).
49. See Nancy Steblay, A Meta-analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 413, 413–24 (1992).
50. See Thomas H. Kramer, Robert Buckhout & Paul Eugenio, Weapon Focus, Arousal,
and Eyewitness Memory: Attention Must be Paid, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 167–84 (1990).
51. See Steblay, supra note 49.
52. See Kramer et al., supra note 50.
53. See Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual
Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 475–91 (2001).
54. Id.
55. See Singer, supra note 48.
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the “misinformation effect.”
Witnesses who report such
unconsciously adopted misinformation do so as rapidly and
confidently as they would report an actual memory.56
Post-event information may also profoundly impair and alter a
witness’s recollection of an individual or event. In an illustrative
study from 1974, Loftus and Palmer showed two separate groups of
participants the same video of two speeding cars and asked them to
estimate their speed. In one group the participants were asked, “How
fast were the cars going when they smashed?” In the other group, the
participants were asked, “How fast were the cars going when they
contacted each other?” The participants who were asked about the
“smashing” cars estimated the speeds as over 40 mph. Participants
who were asked about the cars “contacting” each other estimated the
speeds as only 30 mph.57 When the participants were asked if they
saw any broken glass (there was no broken glass), a third of the
“smash” participants reporting seeing broken glass while only
fourteen percent of the “contact” participants did so.58 The choice of
words influences participants’ perceptions.
Human memory is fragile and decidedly prone to suggestive
influence. When placed in the context of an eyewitness identification
procedure, suggestion may have a powerful impact on a witness’s
memory and substantially alter the witness’s identification testimony.
III. SUGGESTION IN LINEUPS
Individuals who participate in lineups are exposed to a substantial
risk of misidentification resulting from suggestion. How does
suggestion in identification procedures result in this risk to the
suspect? Suggestion, in the context of eyewitness identifications, is
the process by which a witness identifies an individual based on
criteria other than the witness’s independent memory of the event
alone. It is surprisingly simple for a police identification procedure to
become highly suggestive. Very subtle and completely inadvertent
circumstances may influence a witness’s choice during a lineup
procedure. A witness may feel unconscious pressure to identify
someone in the lineup in order to feel that she has not failed her job
or disappointed the officer. Thus, a police officer’s mere presence
56. Id.
57. See GERRIG & ZIMBARDO, supra note 34.
58. Id.

02__MOURER_FINAL.DOC

2008]

REFORMING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

7/23/2008 9:33:03 AM

59

may exert powerful influence on the witness to make an identification
not solely based on independent recall of the event. Even the most
regulated identification procedure carries with it a high risk of
misidentification.
The most well-meaning and hard-working police officer may
inadvertently create a suggestive identification procedure. On the
other hand, occasionally officers do a less than thorough job at
creating a fair lineup, or they even employ intentional suggestion and
influence on the witness to choose the suspect. Many police officers
are no strangers to trickery and mischief in the name of apprehending
criminals. The officer or lineup administrators may unconsciously
suggest the identity of the suspect in a lineup in numerous, subtle
ways. For example, if the suspect is number three in the lineup, the
officer may tell the witness to take her time as she looks at number
three. This may alert the witness to number three in the lineup. The
officer may also falsely bolster the witness’s confidence in the
identification by making statements to her following the identification
(“you picked the suspect”).
These confirming statements
(“confirming feedback”) serve to reinforce the witness’s belief that
she identified the proper individual and may actually transform her
memory of the event to correlate with her viewing of that suspect
pursuant to the “misinformation effect.”59 Subsequently, the witness
will appear highly confident of her identification at trial and influence
the jury. Therefore, an earnest officer who knows the identity of the
suspect, and in good faith believes in the suspect’s guilt, may provide
the eyewitness with confirming feedback that taints the witness’s
testimony at trial.
Despite human memory’s delicate nature and identification
procedures’ unique susceptibility to bias and suggestion, courts
routinely allow prosecutors to use suggestive eyewitness
identifications as evidence against an accused. In part, this is a result
of the view that suggestion in lineups as solely a due process issue.
Wrongful convictions result.

59. See Wells, supra note 27, at 621.
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IV. LINEUPS UNDER DUE PROCESS
The current law surrounding suggestive eyewitness identifications
60
uses a due process analysis alone. The current law’s procedural due
process view creates an inadequate rule largely because, if a court
believes that an identification is correct, it will allow the identification
into evidence, even if it is suggestive. Not only have the Supreme
Court’s protections of the 1960’s been dismantled and misinterpreted,
but in light of today’s extensive research in the area of eyewitness
identifications and human memory, the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court in the 1970’s do not, in fact, adequately safeguard
against misidentifications and wrongful convictions.
In the late 1960’s, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that defendants’ due process rights may be violated as a result of
suggestive police eyewitness identification procedures.61 In 1967, the
Supreme Court decided three cases involving eyewitness
62
identification, often referred to as the “Wade Trilogy.” In United
States v. Wade, the Court granted defendants the right to counsel at all
63
post-indictment, live lineup eyewitness identification procedures.
The Court acknowledged the potential suggestive influence on a
witness and the impact such evidence has on a defendant’s outcome at
trial.64 Then, in Gilbert v. California, the Court addressed in-court
identifications
stemming
from
uncounseled
out-of-court
identifications. It held that an in-court identification may be admitted
if it can be shown that the identification is based upon the witness’s
independent observation of the event and not the improper

60. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196
(1972) (noting that procedural due process governs pre-trial identification procedures). Cf.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 152 (1979) (suggesting that an alleged violation of procedural
due process challenges the adequacy of procedures provided by the state or municipality in
effecting the deprivation of liberty or property). See generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constit. Law §
901 (2007).
61. See Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (finding that the defendant’s due process rights were not violated although
the identification procedure was admittedly suggestive in that the suspect was brought to the
hospital and was the only individual presented to the witness).
62. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
63. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification.”).
64. However, in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973), the Court declined to
extend the defendants’ right to counsel to photographic lineups.
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identification procedure.65 In the third case, Stovall v. Denno,66 the
Supreme Court recognized the need to evaluate identification
procedures by considering the “totality of the circumstances.”67
Stovall requires that an identification be suppressed if it is “so
unnecessarily
suggestive
and
conducive
to
irreparable
misidentification that [the accused] was denied due process of law.”68
The Court held that although the show-up identification procedure
was suggestive, it did not violate the defendant’s due process rights
because of the police’s need for immediate action.69 The Court found
that the show-up identification was imperative, given that the victim
suffered potentially fatal wounds and was in jeopardy of imminent
demise.70 The level of suggestion and the necessity of the use of the
show-up were balanced against one another to result in the admission
of the identification testimony.71 In Simmons v. United States, the
Supreme Court declared that an identification procedure should be
excluded only if “it was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”72 The
Court in Simmons used the circumstances surrounding the event itself
to assess the likelihood of irreparable misidentification. The Simmons
Court focused on whether the identification of the suspect was
correct, rather than necessary.73
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court announced in Manson
v. Braithwaite that even if a lineup is suggestive, it could still be
admitted into evidence if it is found to be “reliable.”74 Manson
rejected the per se exclusion of suggestive identifications and held
that suggestive identifications may still be admissible if they are found
to be otherwise adequately reliable.75 This emphasis on reliability has
led to the admission of eyewitness testimony stemming from highly
suggestive identifications. The Court declared a two-tier test for
determining the admissibility of police eyewitness identifications and

65. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272.
66. See Denno, 388 U.S. at 293.
67. See id. at 302.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
73. Id. at 385 (concluding that the circumstances “leave little room for doubt that the
identification of Simmons was correct”).
74. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
75. Id. at 112–14.
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courtroom identifications. First, it must be determined whether the
pre-trial identification was unnecessarily suggestive.76 If so, a court
must ascertain whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.77 The Court concluded that in order to
ascertain if there is a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification, there must be an assessment of the reliability of the
initial identification.78 The Manson Court declared, “We therefore
conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the
79
admissibility of identification testimony. . . .” What the Court meant
by “reliability” is that the surrounding circumstances provide strong
indicia of the accuracy of the identification. However, it is not
realistic to try to formulate a test that attempts to assess the
likelihood that a flawed lineup is correct. If one could assess this,
courts would admit identifications that identify the guilty and exclude
misidentifications.
The Court in Manson used the test established in its 1972 decision
in Neil v. Biggers to determine when an identification procedure
80
meets the test for reliability. The Biggers Court enumerated several
factors to determine if a suggestive identification is reliable: (1) the
witness’s opportunity to view the suspect; (2) the witness’s degree of
attention; (3) the accuracy of description; (4) the witness’s level of
certainty; and (5) the time between incident and confrontation, i.e.,
identification81 (hereinafter referred to as the Biggers factors). In
Biggers, the perpetrator grabbed the victim in a dimly lit area and
raped her in a wooded area. The victim testified she could see her
assailant well because the moon was full.82 The Court found that
these circumstances indicated a strong likelihood that the

76. Id. at 114.
77. Id. In Manson, an undercover police officer named Jimmy purchased narcotics from
the seller and subsequently gave a description of the seller to another officer. This other officer
later left a single photograph of the defendant on Jimmy’s desk. Jimmy identified the defendant
as the seller.
78. Id. at 112.
79. Id. at 114.
80. In Neil v. Biggers, the Court determined the factors to be considered in deciding the
reliability of a suggestive identification. 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). In Biggers, the Court admitted
the identification of a suspect based upon the presentation of a single photograph to the witness.
It held that although presentation of only one photograph might be suggestive, it did not give
rise to substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 194.
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identification was accurate and stemmed from the witness’s
independent memory of the event.83
Some courts include other corroborating evidence of guilt as a
84
sixth factor to the enumerated five Biggers factors. The Second
Circuit in particular recognizes the absurdity of using other
corroborating evidence of guilt to support the introduction of
eyewitness testimony into evidence. The Second Circuit has written,
“Even where there was irrefutable evidence of the defendant’s guilt, if
an identification was made by a witness who, it transpired, was not
even present at the event, we could hardly term the identification
reliable.”85
On the contrary, the Seventh Circuit considers
corroborating evidence of guilt when assessing the reliability of an
86
identification procedure. In United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, the
court found the identification reliable in part because the defendant
was shown to have been driving the getaway car.
Bobby Joe Leaster spent fifteen years in prison in large part due
to corroborating evidence of guilt.87 According to Justice Marshall,
“By importing the question of guilt into the initial determination of
whether there was a constitutional violation, the apparent effect of
the Court’s decision is to undermine the protection afforded by the
Due Process Clause.”88 Consideration of evidence of guilt should only
89
take place in harmless error reviews—not due process reviews.
The level of suggestion should be balanced against the reliability
of the identification. The Court in Manson stated, “Against these
[Biggers] factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the
90
Many courts fail to balance
suggestive identification itself.”
reliability against level of suggestion and admit suggestive
91
identifications if the Biggers factors are met. These results are partly

83. Id. at 201.
84. Seven circuit courts disagree about whether this factor should be included. The First,
Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits consider other evidence of guilt; while the Second, Third,
and Fifth Circuits look to the reliability of the identification itself. See Gambell, supra note 11.
85. Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 140 (2d Cir. 2001).
86. 814 F.2d 1151, 1156–57, 1161 (7th Cir. 1987).
87. See Kenney, supra note 1.
88. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 128 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. See id. (stating that it is fundamentally unfair to use corroborating evidence of a
defendant’s guilt in any due process violation, and such evaluations should only be done in
harmless error reviews).
90. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Traeger, 289 F.3d 461, 474 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh
Circuit found a photographic array, in which the defendant was the only remarkably large
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a consequence of courts’ struggles with the notion that nonetheless
valid identifications may occur despite highly suggestive identification
procedures. Courts seem unable to create a rule consistent with the
due process viewpoint that can adequately discourage police from
employing suggestive procedures, protect the innocent from
misidentifications, and allow correct identifications into evidence.92
The due process reliability assessment that courts use today does
not prevent irreparable misidentifications as it was intended to do.
The Biggers factors do not provide a true indication of an accurate
identification, because suggestion in the lineup significantly influences
the reliability assessment. The majority of the Biggers factors rely on
self-reports of the witness. However, self-reports of the witness are
subject to the same witness’s distortions of memory and are
influenced by the same suggestion present in the eyewitness
identification procedure. A court makes its reliability assessment
subsequent to the lineup at a hearing on a defense motion to suppress
eyewitness identification testimony. A court generally evaluates the
Biggers factors from the witness’s answers to questions at the hearing,
well after the impact of the suggestive influence.
It is paradoxical, but the more suggestive an identification
procedure is, the more reliable a witness will appear. For example, if
an identifying witness is advised immediately after a lineup that she
identified the suspect (suggestive “confirming feedback”), she will
report a higher level of confidence in her identification. This report of

individual, to be admissible at trial. The defendant was six feet five inches tall and weighed 350
pounds. Astonishingly, the court held that his lineup was not unduly suggestive. Id. The court
went on to hold that even assuming that such a lineup was unduly suggestive it would
nonetheless be admissible as meeting the Biggers factors for reliability. Id. The Sixth Circuit
found a profoundly suggestive identification procedure to be admissible in Howard v. Bouchard,
405 F.3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2005). In Howard, the court concluded that a lineup where the
witness viewed the defendant at the defense table with his lawyer one hour before the
procedure was only “minimally suggestive.” Id. at 470. In Clark v. Caspari, 274 F.3d 507, 511–
12 (8th Cir. 2002), after an evaluation of the Biggers reliability factors, the Eighth Circuit
admitted an identification (a show-up) where the witness viewed two African-American clerks
surrounded by white police officers. There are steps courts should take to motivate police
agencies to institute procedures to minimize suggestion. For example, police agencies could
avoid blatant suggestion as occurred in Traeger with the creation of a national data bank with
photographs of individuals to use in photographic lineups. In this way, photographs that match
the description of the suspect and witness’s description will be readily available to lineup
administrators (even photographs of individuals with unusual characteristics).
92. Furthermore, the Manson and Biggers Courts did not consider the degree to which
human memory is susceptible to police suggestive procedures. See Ruth Yacona, Manson v.
Brathwaite: The Supreme Court’s Misunderstanding of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 551 (2006).
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confidence satisfies one of the Biggers factors and will indicate
reliability of the identification to a court when, in truth, it may only be
a reflection of the suggestion present in the lineup procedure. In fact,
suggestive identifications result in witnesses giving responses that
indicate greater reliability of the identification on all five of the
Biggers factors..93 This effect was demonstrated in an experiment in
which witnesses were given confirming misinformation following a
simulated identification where the culprit was not present. Some
participants were given the suggestive comment that they identified
the right person, and others were told nothing. The lineups were
otherwise identical. Of the participants who were not subject to the
suggestion, only fifteen percent indicated later that they were certain
they identified the right person, but fifty percent of the participants
who were given the suggestive information reported identifying the
right person.94 Furthermore, the participants who received the
suggestive misinformation gave descriptions of the perpetrator that
95
contained greater detail. These witnesses also reported having a
better view of the perpetrator and observing the culprit for a longer
period of time. In other words, every Biggers factor improved in
reliability under suggestive circumstances. Accordingly, the presence
of the Biggers factors does not significantly reduce the likelihood of
misidentification. A Fourth Amendment perspective of suggestive
eyewitness identifications presents alternative solutions.
V. LINEUPS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The significant risk of misidentification from eyewitness
identifications requires protection under the Fourth Amendment.
First, a compelled identification procedure is a seizure and triggers
the Fourth Amendment.
Second, unregulated eyewitness
identifications are prone to high levels of error and suggestion. Both
the physical invasion and the risk of misidentification of the lineup
require Fourth Amendment consideration. It is useful to examine
how courts currently apply the Fourth Amendment to pre-arrest

93. Gary Wells, What is Wrong With the Manson v. Brathwaite Test of Eyewitness
Identification Accuracy?, http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/Mansonproblem.pdf.
94. Amy L. Bradfield, Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Damaging Effect of
Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy,
87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 116–18 (2002).
95. This is presumably from the participant’s observation of the individual in the lineup,
not the individual in the event.
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police investigatory procedures. Ordinarily, a full seizure or arrest
requires probable cause,96 which means that the facts are such that a
prudent person would believe that a suspect has committed, is
97
committing, or is about to commit a crime. When an individual’s
freedom of movement is restricted, he or she has been seized under
the Fourth Amendment.98 The Supreme Court wrote in Terry v. Ohio,
“It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that
person.”99 Courts agree that a physical lineup constitutes a seizure
100
under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment applies as
fully to the investigatory stage as it does to arrest.101 As the Supreme
Court recognized in Davis v. Mississippi, “Investigatory seizures
would subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the
harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention.”102
There are exceptions to the general rule that probable cause is
required prior to a search or seizure. For example, as seen in Terry v.
Ohio, officers may conduct investigatory stops of individuals on less
103
than probable cause. In order for an officer to stop (or detain) an
individual, even briefly, the officer must have specific and articulable
104
An investigatory
facts that reasonably warrant such an intrusion.
stop, or “Terry stop,” which requires reasonable or founded suspicion,
exists when a reasonable person would feel that the person’s right to
move has been restricted.105 Founded or reasonable suspicion is
defined as “a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific
106
and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity.”
Further, the law permits police to conduct a somewhat more intrusive
privacy invasion under certain circumstances in the absence of
probable cause when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that the suspect may be armed.107 In this circumstance, a limited
96. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1968).
97. United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Thomas, 835 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir. 1987)).
98. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
99. Id.
100. See In re Armed Robbery, 659 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
101. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969).
102. Id.
103. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17.
104. Id. at 21.
105. State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510–11 (N.J. 2003) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J.
117, 126 (N.J. 2002) and Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
106. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (8th ed. 2004).
107. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
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“frisk” on the outer clothing is permissible for officer safety only.108
The Court has reaffirmed that the probable-cause exception from
Terry should be narrowly applied, noting that “[b]ecause Terry
involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause,
the Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope.”109
Some police–citizen encounters are permissible in the absence of
any police suspicion of criminal activity. These include circumstances
in which courts find that the citizen was free to leave and thereby not
“seized” within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Situations
where the citizen is free to leave are often called “consensual
encounters,” implying that the citizen has given consent and that the
citizen has no objection to the interaction with the police. However,
in the majority of these situations, the police initiate the interaction.
In many cases, consensual encounters escalate into limited seizures.
In these situations, the legality of the stop is often an issue on
110
appeal.
Another form of police–citizen encounter requiring no suspicion
111
In these
of criminal activity is termed “community caretaking.”
situations, police officers are performing duties consistent with civil
emergencies or a citizen’s personal crisis such as assisting in locating a
lost child. For example, in State v. Chisholm,112 an unmarked police car
noticed a citizen had driven away with his hat still placed on his car
and thus radioed a police car to help the citizen “save” his hat. Upon
stopping the car to inform the citizen about his hat, the officer
observed contraband between the passenger and the driver. The
officer then arrested and charged the occupants. Thus, a citizen was
seized and an arrest was legally accomplished without either probable
cause or reasonable suspicion during a community caretaking activity.
Courts have found other non-testimonial investigatory searches
and seizures to require less than probable cause. In Davis v.

108. Id.
109. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979).
110. See Golphin v. State, 838 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (applying a “totality of
the circumstances test” to conclude that temporary retention of a suspect’s license was not a
seizure when the suspect handed it over voluntarily); Piggot v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 618,
619 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (“By retaining Piggot’s identification, [the officer] implicitly
commanded [him] to stay.”); State v. Thomas, 955 P.2d 420, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (“Once
an officer retains the suspect’s identification or driver’s license and takes it with him to conduct
a warrants check, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.”).
111. Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
112. State v. Chisholm, 696 P.2d 41, 42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
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Mississippi, the Supreme Court found that, although the taking of
fingerprints is no less subject to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment than other detentions, police may compel fingerprints in
113
the absence of probable cause under certain specific circumstances.
The Court rationalized that the taking of fingerprints constitutes a
less serious intrusion on personal liberty than other types of police
searches and detentions. Saliva-swabbing for DNA testing does not
require probable cause for comparable reasons.114 Some states have
enacted statutory guidelines for seeking “Nontestimonial
Identification Orders” (“NTOs”). These rules define when officers
may conduct certain investigatory searches and seizures such as DNA
testing and fingerprinting. These NTOs generally mandate a showing
of reasonable grounds to suspect that the person (suspect) committed
the crime in question.115 Courts, legislatures, and police agencies take
very seriously pre-arrest investigatory intrusions under the Fourth
Amendment, going as far as to seek court orders for such intrusions.
In 1971, the Second Circuit, in Biehunik v. Feliceta, specifically
held that placing an individual in a lineup constitutes a seizure under
116
In Biehunik, the lower court issued an
the Fourth Amendment.
injunction preventing the appearance of sixty-two police officers in
lineups because such compelled appearance constituted a “seizure” in
the absence of a warrant or probable cause.117 There was no basis to
believe that all sixty-two officers had committed a crime. Biehunik
held that probable cause was not necessary to compel the appearance
of the officers in the lineups in part due to their roles as police
officers.118 The court reached this conclusion using the test announced

113. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727–28 (1969).
114. Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Clinton County, 630 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Iowa 2001).
115. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 810.6 (West 2007). See also VT. R. CRIM. P. 41.1
(providing the authority for obtaining an NTO and requiring: (1) that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to suspect, or,
in circumstances where constitutionally required, probable cause to believe, that the person
named or described in the affidavit committed the offense; and (3) that the results of the specific
nontestimonial identification procedures will be of material aid in determining whether the
person named in the affidavit committed the offense).
116. See Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 1971). This writer’s research
revealed very little law specifically indicating the Fourth Amendment status of the suspect
during a lineup. Biehunik explicitly denoted that the suspect is seized during a lineup for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Other cases simply considered the issue while implying or assuming the
suspect was detained or seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. See id. (“A trustworthy police
force is a precondition of minimal social stability in our imperfect society. . . .”).
117. Id. at 229.
118. Id. at 230.
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by the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, finding that the
governmental interest in the particular intrusion must be weighed
against the offense to the individual’s personal dignity and integrity.119
The court in Biehunik found that the substantial public interest in
ensuring police integrity outweighed the individual officer’s privacy
interests.120 In Biehunik, police officers were compelled to submit to a
lineup in the absence of any suspicion of criminal activity.
Accordingly, what level of suspicion that a civilian has committed a
crime should exist before requiring the civilian’s appearance in a
lineup? Biehunik indicates that an individual who is not a public
official would require probable cause before a compelled appearance
in a lineup. Yet, it seems extreme to hold that a civilian may not be
placed in a lineup without probable cause, but a police officer may be
compelled to participate in a lineup absent any suspicion of criminal
activity whatsoever.121 The Supreme Court of Washington has held
that an individual may not be ordered to participate in a lineup where
no probable cause exists to believe that the individual has committed
the offense under investigation.122 On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the compelled
123
appearance of an individual in a lineup on less than probable cause.
Neither court considered the risk of bias and error associated with
lineups as relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry.
Courts generally equate the level of physical intrusion to the
individual with the level of Fourth Amendment protection. Should
the unusual risk associated with participation in a lineup provide the
suspect with heightened Fourth Amendment protections? A simple
look at the plain language of the Fourth Amendment provides
guidance. The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . .
124
The appropriate question pursuant to the language of the
.”
Amendment is: Is the seizure reasonable?
With regard to

119. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–37 (1967) (using the terminology of
“personal security” and “privacy” to describe the individual’s rights in its balancing test).
120. See Biehunik, 441 F.2d at 230–31.
121. In part, this is why this Article proposes a specified suspicion standard that is more than
founded suspicion but less than probable cause before compelling an individual’s appearance in
a lineup.
122. See In re Armed Robbery, 659 P.2d 1092, 1094–95 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
123. Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205, 212–15 (D.C. 1971).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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unregulated identifications, the answer hinges on whether the
reliability associated with an investigatory procedure is relevant to
determine its reasonableness as a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Eyewitness identification procedures are unusually
unreliable. In fact, one finds it difficult to think of a pre-trial
investigatory procedure less reliable.125
Some jurisdictions are
adopting procedural guidelines for the implementation of eyewitness
identification, but these rules are not accompanied by any threat of
exclusion in court to encourage their use by the police.126
127
Misidentifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions. It
follows that a significantly unreliable investigatory police procedure
that may lead to misidentification and even wrongful conviction is
unreasonable. Because an unregulated lineup is unreliable, and thus
unreasonable, in light of its status as a seizure, such a lineup seems on
its face to violate the Fourth Amendment.
However, simply looking at the plain language of the Fourth
Amendment may not end the inquiry.
Courts interpret
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment in terms of the level of
intrusion.128 As the Supreme Court stated in 1967 in Camara v.
Municipal Court, “[T]here is no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize)
against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”129 It may
not be possible to proclaim that a seizure is unfair and therefore
unreasonable through a mere review of the language of the Fourth
Amendment. What factors do courts consider in evaluating the
reasonableness of a seizure? Reasonableness involves balancing

125. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). Police interrogations are also
susceptible to suggestion and police coercion, and courts have responded to this lack of
reliability with constitutional protection, i.e. “Miranda warnings.”
126. STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY ON ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES (Apr. 18, 2001), at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/
njguidelines.pdf; U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 1999), at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf); CAL. COMM’N ON
THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (Apr. 13, 2006), at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/
gwells/California_Commission.pdf); WIS. ATT’Y GEN. OFFICE, REPORT ON MODEL POLICE
PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (Sept.
12,
2005),
at
AND
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/pdfs/Eyewitness Public.pdf .
127. See Gross et al., supra note 15.
128. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–37 (1967).
129. Id. at 536–37.
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governmental interest against the intrusion.130 Not only does an
unregulated lineup involve an increased intrusion to the individual
resulting from the risk of misidentification, but there is also a
powerful governmental interest in protecting citizens from
misidentification. Indeed, courts have linked Fourth Amendment
reasonableness to the reliability or trustworthiness of an investigatory
procedure. In Davis v. Mississippi, the Court compared a detention
for purposes of obtaining fingerprints to one for lineup purposes.
Holding that probable cause was not necessary to detain the
defendant for fingerprinting, the Court noted that fingerprinting is a
more reliable investigatory procedure than eyewitness identifications:
Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and
effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or
confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line131
up and the ‘third-degree.’

Therefore, at least in part because fingerprinting is more reliable and
effective than eyewitness identifications, the Court found that less
than probable cause was required. This supports the conclusion that
the less reliable or effective an investigatory procedure is, the greater
the Fourth Amendment concerns.
Courts subsequently have found the lack of reliability in an
investigatory procedure to trigger heightened Fourth Amendment
protections. In 1983, in State v. Hall, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that only lineup procedures comparable in reliability to
fingerprinting may be sustainable on less than probable cause.132 The
court, referring to language in Davis, stated:
A detention for fingerprinting was also regarded as essentially a
reliable, simple and expeditious proceeding that could be
conducted fairly and without palpable abuse. Accordingly, we
conclude that those identification procedures that are comparable
to fingerprinting will be sustainable upon a showing of less than
133
probable cause.

The court in Hall proclaimed that lineups could be reliable and
effective, thereby requiring less than probable cause, when conducted

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155 (N.J. 1983).
Id. at 1161 (internal citations omitted).
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properly and fairly.134 The court did not specify how police agencies
should be expected to assure that a lineup procedure be comparable
to fingerprinting. With scientific knowledge about the bias and error
associated with eyewitness identifications, procedural guidelines are
the most rational means to achieve more reliable identification
procedures. Hall holds explicitly that the level of prejudice toward
the suspect affects whether or not an intrusion is improper for Fourth
Amendment purposes. The fairness of the procedure and risk of error
are directly connected to the level of intrusion for Fourth
Amendment purposes.135 The Hall court stated:
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Davis observed that ‘abuses’ can
occur in an investigatory detention, mentioning specifically an
‘improper lineup.’ As a result, in order to guarantee that the
detention and accompanying intrusion is not improper or abusive,
it must be accomplished in a fashion designed to produce the least
amount of harassment of, interference with, or prejudice to the
136
suspect.

In many circumstances, the level of physical intrusion on an
individual involved with an identification procedure may not be much
greater than that required for a fingerprint or an investigatory
detention. The level of physical intrusion varies widely in eyewitness
137
identifications. It ranges from a very brief “show-up” on the street
to a live lineup at the police station requiring considerable time and
effort on the part of the detainee. In fact, application of procedural
safeguards will often result in a greater physical intrusion to the
individual. The application of the guidelines proposed in this Article
will necessarily increase the level of physical intrusiveness involved in
any compelled eyewitness identification procedure. For example, it
will require that the suspect be detained a longer period of time while
a blind administrator and appropriate fillers are located. Does the
Fourth Amendment permit or even require a greater physical
intrusion to the person’s body to protect him or her from the potential
of some greater harm via misidentification? Given the frequency of

134. See id. at 1160–62.
135. See Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Court for Clinton County, 630 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Iowa 2001)
(finding that less than probable cause is necessary for DNA testing in part because it is a valid
investigatory technique).
136. State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155, 1162 (N.J. 1983) (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 727 (1969)).
137. A show-up identification is characterized by the witness being presented with only one
suspect for possible identification; no fillers are included. See supra note 13.
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misidentifications and wrongful convictions, this potential harm is one
that should be of serious governmental and public interest.
Courts have long recognized the risk of suggestion and prejudice
138
Yet, courts evaluate whether or not
in eyewitness identifications.
suggestive eyewitness identifications are constitutional solely through
a due process analysis.139 This due process perspective has failed to
protect citizens from an unreasonable risk of misidentification. The
law will most effectively protect citizens from the dangers of
unregulated eyewitness identifications if courts recognize that the
risks involved with lineups trigger heightened Fourth Amendment
protections.
The Fourth Amendment provides more specific
protections than does a due process evaluation and, consequently,
courts must consider the Fourth Amendment first. As the Supreme
Court wrote in Albright v. Oliver, “Substantive due process should be
reserved for otherwise homeless substantial claims, and should not be
relied on when doing so will duplicate protection that a more specific
constitutional provision already bestows.”140
A Fourth Amendment analysis of unfairly suggestive eyewitness
identification procedures will necessarily result in the exclusion of the
identification testimony at trial. The current law’s insistence on
analyzing suggestive identifications through a due process lens creates
an inadequate rule largely because, if courts believe a suggestive
identification is nonetheless correct, they allow the identification into
evidence. A Fourth Amendment consideration of an identification
procedure should not assess whether or not the identification was, in
fact, accurate despite the lineup’s lack of fairness. For example, when
a court determines whether the search of a defendant that located
cocaine in the defendant’s pocket was an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment, the court will not consider whether the
substance was, in fact, cocaine. If the search was unreasonable, the
court will exclude the drugs from evidence. In this example, there is
141
no question that the individual was actually guilty. But in the
interest of regulating police conduct and protecting innocent citizens,
the exclusionary rule applies. Otherwise, courts have no power to
protect citizens from police misconduct.

138. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229, 236 (1967).
139. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977).
140. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 267 (1994).
141. Excluding, of course, situations in which the police may have planted the evidence on
the defendant or where laboratory tests later reveal that the substance in question is not illegal.
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Similarly, without excluding identification testimony resulting
from unregulated identification procedures, courts lack any authority
to encourage implementation of safeguards to protect the innocent
against misidentifications resulting from suggestive identification
procedures. The deterrence of abusive or unfair police conduct is a
vital role of the exclusionary rule, especially when stemming from
Fourth Amendment violations. The Supreme Court noted: “Ever
since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of
discouraging lawless police conduct.”142 Cases founded on due
process claims are void of any discussion of the goal of deterrence of
police misconduct via the exclusionary rule.143 Courts’ only authority
to protect citizens from invasions of their liberty is through the
exclusionary rule, as courts are otherwise powerless to influence or
regulate police procedures. The exclusionary rule, as it applies to the
Fourth Amendment, contains “remedial objectives,” and courts have
found that it applies only where the objective of deterrence can be
furthered.144
Police often create bias and unfair identification procedures
unwittingly. One could argue that the exclusionary rule cannot deter
inadvertent conduct. However, it would be intellectually dishonest
for a police agency to assert that it did not know that inadvertent
influences on witnesses are commonplace in the absence of
procedural safeguards. In other words, police know that regulating
lineups is good police practice and that failure to regulate a lineup
puts the suspect in jeopardy of misidentification. Failure to use
specific procedural standards is not accidental. Further, “[g]ood faith
is not a magic lamp for police officers to rub whenever they find
themselves in trouble.”145 Courts should apply the exclusionary rule if
it can reasonably be said to instill a “greater degree of care”146 in
officers in future investigations. The judiciary should not be less
concerned with regulating police conduct in an eyewitness
identification procedure than in more traditional searches and

142. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
143. My research did not locate any discussion of the exclusionary rule as it applies to due
process claims and the goal of deterring police misconduct.
144. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
145. State v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
146. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
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seizures.147 Police conduct surrounding identification procedures
requires regulation and judicial enforcement.
Courts should apply the exclusionary rule where the benefits of
148
The potential social cost of
deterrence outweigh the social costs.
applying the exclusionary rule to eyewitness identification testimony
would be the inadmissibility of eyewitness testimony from one
government witness. In some circumstances, the government may be
unable to proceed with the charges. In many other cases, the
prosecution will be capable of proceeding to trial with other
identification testimony and other incriminating evidence, albeit with
a weaker case. The social cost is exceedingly low when balanced
against the conviction of an innocent person. The social cost from the
application of the exclusionary rule in other Fourth Amendment
violations involves the exclusion of unquestionably valid evidence.
For example, when an illegal, warrantless search reveals drugs, a trial
court will suppress the drugs. On the other hand, the social cost of
excluding eyewitness testimony stemming from unregulated
identification procedures includes the significant likelihood that the
court is excluding invalid evidence. Therefore, application of the
exclusionary rule to eyewitness testimony protects innocent citizens.
The benefit of applying the exclusionary rule to identification
procedures is that it protects the innocent from wrongful conviction.
This prospect is not speculative conjecture but rather a concrete
reality, because faulty eyewitness identifications account for more
wrongful convictions than all other causes combined.149 This benefit
far outweighs the social cost. A vital distinction between lineups and
other police procedures triggering the Fourth Amendment is, in
eyewitness identifications, innocent citizens may be arrested due to
police misconduct. Police will not ordinarily arrest innocent citizens
who are subject to other Fourth Amendment violations stemming
from police misconduct,150 precisely because the police will not
147. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906–07. Although the Leon Court refused to exercise the
exclusionary rule if the police were exhibiting “good faith” when searching and securing
evidence, the Court clarified that this “good faith” exception would be appropriate only with
“reliable physical evidence,” which does not include eyewitness identifications. Id. at 912–13.
148. For example, in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the Supreme Court found
that violations of the knock and announce rule do not require application of the exclusionary
rule. The Court held that the social cost of suppression of the evidence outweighed the benefits
of deterring police non-compliance with the knock and announce rule.
149. See Gross et al., supra note 15, at 542.
150. Examples of other police misconduct include violations of the knock and announce
rule, lack of probable cause or founded suspicion, and failure to obtain a warrant.
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discover any condemning evidence. The societal interest in regulating
police conduct for the majority of other Fourth Amendment
violations is to protect the innocent citizen’s personal dignity and
privacy. Conversely, a suggestive or unregulated lineup may produce
damning but false eyewitness testimony that could result in the arrest
and even conviction of an innocent citizen. The innocent citizen has
more to lose as a result of police misconduct during a lineup than
suffering mere embarrassment or personal indignities. The Biggers
“reliability” assessment used by the courts is unsuccessful in
determining a correct identification from an incorrect one.
Accordingly, current law does not accurately recognize
misidentifications and exclude them from evidence at trial, placing
citizens in great jeopardy. Application of procedural safeguards will
facilitate the identification of the truly guilty by helping to ensure that
the witness has identified the suspect from her independent
recollection of the event. Therefore, to apply a per se rule of
exclusion for unregulated lineups is a unique application of the
exclusionary rule, because it protects the innocent as well as
encourages the arrest and conviction of the guilty.151
Identification procedures are a particularly fertile soil for police–
citizen misunderstanding, police mischief, and citizen risk. Jerome H.
Skolnick asks, “To what extent if at all is it proper for law
enforcement officials to employ trickery and deceit as part of their
152
He continues, “The reality is:
law enforcement practices?”
Deception is considered by police—and the courts as well—to be as
153
natural to detecting as pouncing is to a cat.” Indeed, deception may
be a part of all aspects of police work from arrest to trial, but Skolnick
states that the area where deception is most prevalent is in the
investigatory stages. A quote from Justice Without Trial is appropriate
here: “The policeman operates as one whose aim is to legitimize the
evidence pertaining to a case, rather than as a jurist whose goal is to
analyze the sufficiency of the evidence based on case law.”154 In short,
Skolnick states that the police are “routinely permitted and advised to

151. Application of guidelines for lineups will serve the social mission of facilitating
conviction of the guilty as well. Eyewitness testimony stemming from proper lineups with
adequate safeguards will result in more frequent identifications of the guilty and stronger
evidence at trial.
152. Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1(2) CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS 40 (Summer/Fall
1982).
153. Id. at 40.
154. Id. at 43 (quoting JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 214 (2d. ed. 1975)).
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employ deceptive techniques and strategies in the investigative
process.”155
Consequently, Fourth Amendment analysis of
unregulated identification procedures is crucial to the fair
administration of justice, because under the Fourth Amendment,
courts may regulate police behavior and implement consequences for
failure of police to use adequate procedural safeguards.
Like their treatment of coerced confessions, courts should
suppress identification testimony stemming from a biased or unfair
procedure. Courts agree that the use of a coerced confession against
a defendant denies the defendant due process of law no matter how
strong the other evidence against him at trial,156 because the violated
right is so fundamental. The similarities between a coerced confession
157
Both
and an unregulated identification procedure are obvious.
outcomes rely on the functioning of the human mind. Both
procedures may be highly influenced by suggestion and psychological
influence of police officers. Both types of evidence are persuasive to
juries to convict. Both procedures may result in erroneous outcomes
by both purposeful as well as inadvertent police behavior. Citizens
placed in identification procedures merit protections similar to those
individuals subjected to interrogations. Consequently, under a Fourth
Amendment analysis, courts should suppress an identification
stemming from an unreasonable suggestive identification seizure
regardless of the culpability of the suspect.
According to Justice Brennan, “Nothing is more clear than that
the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions
upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions
be termed ‘arrests’ or ‘investigatory detentions.’”158 How can one
sensibly assert that unregulated, suggestive identification procedures
do not invade and threaten an individual’s personal security?
Certainly, criminal accusation, jail, prosecution, and even wrongful
conviction are among the most profound invasions of personal
155. Id. at 45.
156. See Payne v. State of Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); see also Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 43 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“When involuntary confessions have been
introduced at trial, the Court has always reversed convictions regardless of other evidence of
guilt.”).
157. There is one notable difference between the exclusionary rule as it applies to Fourth
Amendment as opposed to Fifth Amendment violations. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment contains its own self-executing exclusionary rule. Conversely, Fourth
Amendment remedies are judicially imposed sanctions and are not derived from the text of the
amendment itself. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2004).
158. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969).
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security.159 To say that the mere risk of these personal security
invasions does not equate to an increased privacy concern would be
intellectually short-sighted—as if to say that one only needs to wear a
parachute after jumping out of the plane, not to don it while still on
board. Once you are falling, you cannot put on the parachute. Once a
misidentification has occurred, arrest and prosecution are imminent.
It is too late for Fourth Amendment protections, and the wrongly
accused is assured of suffering tremendous invasions of personal
security that will affect the rest of the accused’s life. To protect
citizens from such invasions, the protections must be implemented
prior to the eyewitness identification procedure itself.
VI. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
A. Specific Suspicion of Criminal Activity Required for Appearance
in a Lineup
The Fourth Amendment does not provide a uniform legal
criterion through which officers may compel an individual to
participate in a lineup. Placing an individual in a lineup exposes him
or her to substantial risk. The reality of everyday police work is that
police routinely present individuals to victims and witnesses on the
street for identification in the absence of any procedural safeguards.160
Placing an individual in a lineup is a greater privacy intrusion for
Fourth Amendment purposes than an “investigatory stop” but is less
of an intrusion than arrest. Police frequently seek probable cause for
arrest through eyewitness identification procedures. To require
probable cause prior to an identification procedure may unfairly tie
the officer’s hands—it may require the officer to forego the
apprehension of an unreasonable number of guilty individuals due to
lack of probable cause for arrest. Consequently, this Article proposes

159. A person’s right to privacy is also protected under Article 12 of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Art. 12, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). United Nations member countries are
morally, if not legally, bound by such declarations. Certainly, misidentification qualifies as an
attack upon honor or reputation. The very real threat of misidentification that accompanies an
unregulated identification procedure requires legal protection under this provision.
160. This statement is based on interviews with multiple criminal defense attorneys and
public defenders in Miami, Florida.
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a new legal standard that will reasonably restrict which individuals
may be placed as suspects in any identification procedures.161 Police
would have to meet this new legal criterion before they could compel
an individual’s appearance in a lineup. It is reasonable and desirable
to propose a straightforward standard for identification procedures
that would be similar to the current “reasonable suspicion” standard
(i.e., Terry stop) but with the addition of a particularized wrongdoing
component.162 Under this proposed standard, the language to define
the grounds for placing an individual in an identification procedure
would nearly mirror the standard for investigatory detentions. It
would state:
An individual may be placed in an identification procedure only if
the officer has a particularized suspicion based upon an objective
observation that the person being placed in the procedure has been
engaged in the specific criminal wrongdoing observed by the
witness.

Should the government fail to meet the burden of proving that the
officer possessed this level of suspicion prior to compelling an
individual’s attendance at a lineup, the trial court should exclude the
identification. This standard would not differ from the current
standard required for an investigatory stop, other than that the officer
must have specific and articulable facts to reasonably believe that the
suspect was in fact the culprit of the specific crime observed by the
witness, as opposed to some generalized, unidentified wrongdoing.
Application of such a standard is practical and understandable, and
will diminish the peril in which a suspect is placed pursuant to even
the most regulated lineup procedure.
B. Guidelines to Reduce Suggestion in Eyewitness Identification
Procedures
Effective eyewitnesses identification warrants specific procedural
guidelines to minimize suggestion and bias in the lineup. State v. Hall
suggests that identification procedures predicated on less than

161. See Wells, supra note 27, at 635–36, for an example of a similar standard. Gary Wells
proposes a criterion that officers must have reasonable suspicion before placing an individual in
a lineup. Wells does not suggest an exact definition of “reasonable suspicion,” noting that it is a
policy definition, not a scientific one. However, Wells states that it should be less than probable
cause. Id.
162. A mere investigatory detention is acceptable whether or not the officer can identify the
specific crime or wrongdoing in which the individual might have been engaged.
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probable cause be admissible only if they are equivalent in reliability
to fingerprinting.163 Eyewitness identifications may never be as
reliable as a scientific procedure like fingerprinting.
Yet,
implementing specific procedural guidelines that minimize prejudice
and error will make identification procedures more reliable. Only if
such guidelines accompany a lineup should a court sustain the lineup
164
on less than probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, this Article suggests nine specific guidelines to protect
innocent citizens from misidentification for use during an
165
identification procedure. These guidelines include the use of blind
administrators and a sufficient number of fillers who may each
reasonably resemble the suspect.166 Adopting mandatory procedures
for eyewitness identifications is the most significant step police could
take to reduce wrongful convictions.167 As reflected in Davis, the
reliability of police investigatory procedures triggers Fourth
168
Therefore, guidelines that maximize the
Amendment concerns.
reliability of lineups are important under the Fourth Amendment.

163. See State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155, 1161 (N.J. 1983)
164. A Fourth Amendment analysis in no way negates the necessity for a due process
inquiry. For example, although the existence of probable cause may not trigger the requirement
for use of the guidelines under the Fourth Amendment, the lack of the use of guidelines may
result in impermissible suggestion under a due process inquiry.
165. See Sarah Anne Mourer, Prophylactic Guidelines for Florida Eyewitness Identifications
(on file with author).
166. Id. The following guidelines are suggested:
1. The lineup must be double blind.
2. The lineup must contain a minimum of five fillers.
3. The suspect must not stand out in the lineup.
4. The fillers must reasonably resemble either the suspect or the witness’s description of
the perpetrator.
5. Only one suspect must be included in the lineup.
6. The same fillers should not be reused when showing multiple lineups with different
suspects to the same witness.
7. If the lineup is photographic:
a. Select a photograph of the suspect that resembles the suspect’s appearance
or description at the time of the incident.
b. Ensure that no writing or information on the photographs is visible to the
witness.
c.
Preserve the photo array in the same condition as it was shown to the
witness.
8. The lineup administrator must record both identification and/or non-identification
results in writing.
9. A written statement of confidence must be taken from the witness immediately
following an identification.
167. Id.
168. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
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The Fourth Amendment requires two steps to protect a suspect
from an unfair and unreliable lineup procedure. First, police must
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to conducting a
lineup. Second, the lineup as conducted must continue to be
reasonable in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. In fact, a
lineup seizure may be viewed as a series of steps, each requiring
Fourth Amendment protections. Generally, a suspect will first be
detained requiring founded suspicion of criminal activity. Then, if the
police obtain a heightened degree of specified founded suspicion, they
may order the suspect to participate in a lineup. Lastly, as the lineup
occurs and the suspect is actually exposed to the risk of
misidentification, procedural guidelines are necessary under the
Fourth Amendment.
During all three phases of this police
investigatory procedure, the citizen is placed in different and
increasing levels of risk and intrusion under the Fourth Amendment.
Consequently, each phase of the lineup investigatory procedure
requires safeguards. Under a Fourth Amendment analysis, failure to
use proper procedural guidelines in a pre-arrest compelled eyewitness
identification procedure would result in exclusion of the identification
testimony at trial.169
VII. EXCEPTIONS
The use of safeguards proposed in Section VI has two types of
exceptions: (1) those identification procedures that do not trigger the
Fourth Amendment, and (2) those that are “reasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment without the safeguards. First, only a compelled
appearance in a lineup would be considered a seizure thereby
implicating Fourth Amendment concerns. One is not seized if he or
170
she is free to leave. Thus, giving consent to participate in a lineup
would waive these procedural requirements because the police would
not have seized the individual. Consent is a tricky issue when it
comes to police–citizen encounters. When does a citizen know that he
171
As noted earlier, “consensual police
or she is free to refuse?

169. Due process also requires the implementation of the above guidelines. This is a topic
for a future article.
170. See United States v. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); see also United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980).
171. This scenario brings to mind Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and raises an
inquiry as to whether officers should be required to advise citizens that they have the right to
refuse to participate in a lineup in the absence of the procedural safeguards.
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encounters” do not require any level of suspicion and do not trigger
the Fourth Amendment. Bear in mind that officers do not (the vast
majority of the time) ask the citizen for permission to approach prior
to making the request for a driver’s license, to participate in a lineup,
or for other information. If the government intends to use consent as
an exception its burden should be great.172 The prosecution should be
required to show that the consent was, in fact, informed. This would
include informing the suspect of: (1) the right not to consent; (2) the
risks of misidentification in an unregulated lineup or show-up; and (3)
what rights the suspect is giving up, including the specific guidelines
and level of suspicion normally required. The most expeditious and
thorough procedure for obtaining such consent would be via a waiver
form that officers could carry with them for the suspect to sign. This
Article does not intend to advocate revamping the entire body of law
regarding the police obligation to inform citizens of their right to
refuse to a search. Currently, the police have no obligation to do so.173
However, in the typical search and seizure, the innocent citizen has
nothing to fear past embarrassment and inconvenience. The innocent
citizen invited to participate in a lineup should fear misidentification
and even wrongful conviction. One can easily imagine a scenario in
which an innocent citizen would prefer to consent to a show-up on the
street as opposed to a drive to the station to wait for a proper lineup.
Yet, one can also easily surmise that this innocent citizen is
completely unaware of the risk she is taking by participating in the
show-up.
Only adequate information regarding the risk of
misidentification should render such consent voluntary.174
Other exceptions trigger Fourth Amendment concerns, but courts
may find them reasonable in the absence of procedural safeguards.
One example is identification procedures that take place following
arrest. In this instance, probable cause that the individual committed
the crime already exists. At this point, the Fourth Amendment may
not protect the arrestee from the privacy invasion involved with a

172. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558–59 (“[A]lthough the Constitution does not require
proof of knowledge of right to refuse [to consent to search] as sine qua non of an effective
consent to search, such knowledge was highly relevant to determination that there had been
consent.” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973))).
173. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.
174. Courts already hold that a knowing and intelligent waiver standard must be applied to
test the waiver of counsel at a post-indictment lineup. See id. at 240; United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967).
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lineup to the same degree. In fact, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure go as far as to state:
Once an accused is lawfully in custody for one offense, the
Government may place him in a lineup for any number of offenses
it chooses without prior court authorization, so long as it can
otherwise assure the presence of counsel at the lineup, that the
lineup will be conducted in conformity with due process and
175
presentment before a magistrate without undue delay.

Furthermore, defendants have a right to counsel at post-arrest
lineups.176 An individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches
when judiciary proceedings have begun against the individual (this
includes the filing of information, arraignment, or preliminary
hearing).177
Perhaps a sensible rule would be to require implementation of
guidelines to minimize suggestion in lineups even following probable
178
cause unless counsel is present. As Justice Brennan stated in United
States v. Wade,
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice,
intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable
of reconstruction at trial, and since the presence of counsel itself
can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at
trial, there can be little doubt that . . . the post-indictment lineup
[is] a critical stage of the prosecution at which [defendant is] as
179
much entitled to such aid . . . as at the trial itself.

One should recall that the existence of probable cause in no way
negates the necessity for a due process inquiry.180 This raises the issue
of in-court identifications. Although any in-court identification is
181
necessarily highly suggestive, it will not trigger Fourth Amendment
considerations. In-court identifications necessarily take place after
the suspect is arrested and charged and after probable cause has been

175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
176. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
177. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–89 (1972).
178. Post-arrest identification procedures constitute an extensive topic for a later article.
179. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
180. Due process should also require the implementation of the above guidelines. This is a
topic for a future article.
181. The vast majority of the time, in-court identifications occur where a witness on the
stand scans the courtroom to identify the defendant on trial. Usually, the defendant is quite
obvious.
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found by both the judge and government. In-court identification
admissibility must remain a due process analysis.182
183
It is in the
Exigent circumstances provide another exception.
public’s interest to allow strictly limited exceptions relying on exigent
circumstances. The reasonableness of an unregulated identification
procedure “depends on a balance between the public interest and the
184
individual’s right to personal security. . . .” An example of legitimate
exigent circumstances can be found in Stovall v. Denno.185 In Stovall,
the defendant was the only suspect presented to a victim at the
hospital—there were no fillers. However, the officers had reason to
believe that the victim was mortally injured and would soon die.186
One could assert that a likely correct eyewitness identification
obtained by illegal means might satisfy an inevitable discovery
exception to the application of the exclusionary rule. Courts apply
the inevitable discovery doctrine when it is determined that the police
would have obtained the same evidence by other legal means.187 For
example, if the police obtain statements from a suspect that lead to
incriminating evidence while violating the suspect’s right against self
incrimination, that evidence may still be admissible if it can be shown
that the police would have located the evidence through other legal
means anyway. When a court applies the inevitable discovery
doctrine to determine whether an identification is correct, it operates
under the presumption that, had the police used proper safeguards,
the same suspect would have been identified anyway. However, this
rationale fails on three grounds.
First, courts generally view the “inevitable discovery” doctrine as
an exception to the “fruit of the poisonous tree” rule. Thus, most
courts do not allow the admission of illegally obtained primary
188
An eyewitness
evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
182. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)
183. Exigent circumstances are those which present the officer with an emergency that
requires immediate action. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (“The
officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed that he was confronted
with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances,
threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’” (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964))).
184. United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
185. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
186. Id. at 295.
187. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
188. See id. at 443 (involving suppression of derivative evidence and calling for a deterrence
inquiry). See also United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that under
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identification stemming from a suggestive procedure is not derivative
but is the primary fruit of the police misconduct and should therefore
not be eligible under the inevitable discovery exception.189
Second, the inevitable discovery rule applies only if the police do
not benefit from the misconduct, i.e., the police may not be placed in a
better position through a failure to act properly.190 In other words, the
law should not permit the police to further their investigations or
obtain admissible evidence for trial by breaking the rules or through
misconduct. Acquiring identification testimony through the use of
police suggestion or a violation of the specified founded suspicion
requirement is a benefit from police misconduct.191
Finally, to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine, it must be
determined that the evidence would have actually been discovered.
As it pertains to eyewitness identifications, an inevitable discovery
analysis would call for the determination that the same witness would
have identified the same suspect despite the suggestive or unfair
lineup procedures. The Court claimed in Nix v. Williams that
“inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on

the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, unlawfully seized evidence is
admissible if there is no doubt that police would have lawfully discovered evidence later);
United States v. Strmel, 574 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. La. 1983) (finding that to fit within the
inevitable discovery exception, the government must show with reasonable probability that the
police would have uncovered the derivative evidence apart from the illegal actions).
189. However, some courts disagree that the inevitable discovery doctrine only applies to
derivative evidence. United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 979 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We decline to
embrace the suggestion that courts should confine the inevitable discovery rule to cases in which
the disputed evidence comprises a derivative, rather than primary, fruit of unlawful police
conduct.”). See also People v. Burola, 848 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1993); United States v. Pimentel,
810 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1987).
190. Julie M. Giddings, The Interaction of the Standing and Inevitable Discovery Doctrines of
the Exclusionary Rule: Use of Evidence Illegally Obtained from the Defendant and a Third Party,
91 IOWA L. REV. 1063 (2006). See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
191. Conversely, it is arguable that the defendant should not unnecessarily benefit from the
exclusion of eyewitness testimony by obtaining the ability to argue at trial the lack of any
identification testimony. Such an argument by defense counsel may fairly “open the door” to
the prosecution’s introduction of the identification evidence. It is questionable whether the
mere assertion at trial by defense counsel that the defendant did not commit the crime or the
defendant’s testimony that she is not the perpetrator would open the gates to the admissibility
of previously excluded identification testimony. Imagine the scenario where the evidence at
trial includes identification testimony from two eyewitnesses that was obtained through proper
procedures. There exists also a pretrial identification from a third eyewitness that was
suppressed due to lack of procedural safeguards. Shall this defendant be precluded from
testifying regarding an alibi without the third witnesses’ identification testimony then becoming
admissible evidence? Shall her lawyer be prohibited from the defense of misidentification
without such consequences? This Article hopes to spark future discussions and writings on
these topics.
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demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or
impeachment.”192 Courts are unable to reasonably ascertain whether
the witness would have identified the same suspect even in ideal
circumstances. Therefore, this analysis is speculative and will not
satisfy an inevitable discovery inquiry.
This Article focuses on the pre-arrest compelled appearance of an
individual in a lineup—a situation that clearly triggers the Fourth
Amendment, because the person’s body is seized and the individual is
not free to leave. There may be other exceptions not contemplated
within the scope of this Article. For example, does the placement of
one’s photograph in an identification procedure implicate the Fourth
Amendment and require protections? What if an individual is not
even aware that her image was placed in an identification procedure
as a suspect? The issue with regard to photographs would be whether
the placement of an individual’s photograph in an identification
procedure is a search or seizure in terms of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment is
triggered in some circumstances where the individual may not even
be aware that he or she is being searched. For example, in Kyllo v.
United States, the Court found that the following constitutes a search:
The police used a heat-detecting device only on the outside of an
individual’s home. When the police discovered heat, they inferred that
an illegal substance was inside the house from the existence of the
193
heat on the exterior of the house. Therefore, the Court held that the
police investigatory procedure caused an invasion of privacy pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public is not subject to Fourth Amendment protections.194 Although
one’s photograph may be taken without Fourth Amendment
implications, if the individual is in a location where the individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy, it is debatable whether the
Fourth Amendment should limit what the government may
subsequently do with that photograph. If we accept the premise that

192. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
193. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
194. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that what a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection). See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that petitioner could not
claim an expectation of privacy in friend’s purse).
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potential risk of harm and error equates to a Fourth Amendment
privacy intrusion, then we may answer in the affirmative.195
VIII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The compelled physical appearance of an individual in an
eyewitness identification procedure constitutes a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This Article presents the idea
that the high probability of misidentification associated with
unregulated eyewitness identification procedures requires Fourth
Amendment protections. This risk of misidentification amounts to a
significant privacy intrusion under the Fourth Amendment. This
Article also explains why courts’ current reliance solely on a
procedural due process analysis of eyewitness identifications fails to
protect citizens from misidentification and should not be the first
constitutional consideration when determining the lawfulness of an
identification procedure. It is simply not possible to separate the
influence of insufficient procedural safeguards in a lineup from the
validity of the ensuing identification. The Biggers factors dramatically
fail to measure the accuracy of an identification. The influence of
suggestion from the lack of adequate procedural safeguards increases
the appearance of a correct identification without being a true
indicator that the identification is actually valid. In other words, it is
conjecture to presume that an unregulated lineup identified the true
culprit.
The risk of misidentification from an unregulated lineup is welldocumented.
Numerous research and laboratory findings
demonstrate that human memory is highly susceptible to suggestive
influence. Eyewitness identification procedures are particularly
susceptible to suggestion and bias. Courts cannot ignore this risk of
error associated with identification procedures under the Fourth
Amendment. Courts recognize that the physical aspect of a lineup is
a privacy invasion pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Cases such as
Davis v. Mississippi also suggest that the lack of reliability of certain

195. Citizens may expect the police to exhibit a certain degree of care and reasonableness
with a photograph, even if obtained legally. The Fourth Amendment may also require that the
police utilize guidelines and safeguards with lineups involving photographs of individuals that
may have been taken without initially implicating the Fourth Amendment. However, there are
different implications involved with the use of a photo array, and this is a fertile issue for a
future article. This issue is by no means clear.
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pretrial investigatory procedures requires heightened Fourth
Amendment protections.196
This Article further recommends the implementation of two
procedural safeguards for use in eyewitness identifications. First,
police must have a minimum of “specified suspicion” of criminal
activity before requiring an individual to appear in a lineup. Second,
specific procedural guidelines designed to minimize suggestion in the
lineup should be required. Failure to utilize these procedural
safeguards should result in the exclusion of any identification
testimony at trial, because the purpose of the exclusionary rule as it
pertains to the Fourth Amendment is to regulate police conduct.
Such a rule is also in accord with general standards of fairness and
justice.
This Article suggests that a due process inquiry occur after the
assessment of Fourth Amendment claims. The benefits of the
application of the exclusionary rule to identification testimony
unaccompanied by procedural safeguards outweigh the social cost.
No pretrial police investigatory procedure other than eyewitness
identifications produces significant numbers of false arrests of
innocent individuals.
Regulation of eyewitness identification
procedures will result in the protection of the innocent from arrest
and wrongful conviction.
IX. CONCLUSION
Studies confirm that unregulated eyewitness testimony is often
“hopelessly unreliable.”197 Misidentifications are the greatest single
198
Courts have
source of wrongful convictions in the United States.
historically recognized that the risks and hazards associated with
unregulated lineups implicate procedural due process concerns.199 Yet
courts’ current due process analyses are unsuccessful in ensuring fair
lineup procedures and preventing wrongful convictions. A due
process analysis alone is inadequate, in part because a due process
analysis is essentially a fairness inquiry, and courts regard it as unfair
to exclude a correct, yet suggestive identification, from evidence. On

196.
197.
198.
199.
(1977).

Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E. 2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995).
See Gross et al., supra note 15.
See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98
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the other hand, the exclusionary rule, as it applies to the Fourth
Amendment, functions to regulate police procedures and conduct.200
Therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis of suggestive identification
procedures will result in exclusion of eyewitness testimony stemming
from identification procedures that are unreasonable seizures,
whether or not the resulting identifications are likely to be correct.
Compelled identification procedures that are unregulated require
exclusion under the Fourth Amendment.
Data regarding misidentifications proves there is significant risk in
allowing unregulated identification procedures. Seizures involving
such significant risk are not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The guidelines outlined here are based on scientific research
regarding identification procedures and human memory. These
safeguards would serve to minimize the risk of misidentification that
is so prevalent in identification procedures. Furthermore, with these
safeguards, eyewitness identifications admitted into evidence at trial
would carry greater evidentiary value and greater weight with the
jury. Prosecution cases would then be stronger. Procedural
safeguards would also insulate the police from criticisms of biased
eyewitness identifications, bolster public confidence in the police, and
promote a more positive image of the police in general.
Given our more comprehensive understanding of human memory
and the influence of suggestion, perhaps courts will appreciate
eyewitness identification procedures in terms of both privacy and due
process. If the reasonableness of a seizure is determined by balancing
governmental interest against the intrusion, then the Fourth
Amendment requires procedural safeguards for identification
procedures on both accounts. The government has a strong interest in
protecting citizens from misidentification. Further, the high risk of
misidentification that accompanies an unregulated lineup equates to
an increased security risk under the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court has long found that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”201 As Bobby Joe Leaster’s story
shows, misidentifications do happen, despite strong indicia of

200. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984).
201. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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reliability. One can hardly envision a governmental intrusion more
serious and more offensive than wrongful accusation, jail, prosecution,
conviction, or even death.

